Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible by Tahk, Susannah Camic
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 81 Issue 5 Article 16 
2013 
Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible 
Susannah Camic Tahk 
University of Wisconsin Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Susannah Camic Tahk, Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2683 (2013). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol81/iss5/16 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 




MAKING IMPOSSIBLE TAX REFORM POSSIBLE 
Susannah Camic Tahk* 
 
The United States has long struggled to reform its federal income tax 
code. Despite enthusiastic and widespread bipartisan support for tax 
reform laws that would eliminate special-interest loopholes, the legislative 
process has been paralyzed when it comes to passing these laws.  This 
Article proposes a solution to this seemingly intractable federal tax 
lawmaking paralysis.  This paralysis arises because tax reform spreads its 
benefits among broad groups while concentrating its costs on narrow ones.  
Political science theory accurately predicts that laws with this cost-benefit 
allocation will fail.  However, federal lawmakers can overcome tax 
lawmaking paralysis by distributing tax reform’s costs and benefits 
differently.  In particular, the federal government can do this by following 
the examples of states that have successfully escaped tax lawmaking 
paralysis by earmarking taxes for specific purposes.  This Article examines 
the phenomenon of earmarking and examines several instances of 
earmarked state taxes.  In so doing, this Article argues that earmarking tax 
revenues for particular purposes offers an opportunity for lawmakers to 
permanently reform the tax code at last. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, fervent calls for tax reform in the United States have 
crossed party lines.  In his 2012 acceptance speech, President Barack 
Obama proclaimed that he was “looking forward to reaching out and 
working with leaders of both parties to meet the challenges we can only 
solve together.  Reducing our deficit.  Reforming our tax code.”1  
Presidential candidate Governor Mitt Romney explained in a debate during 
the primary election that, as president, he would begin a process of 
“reshaping the entire tax code.”2 
Going back in time, two campaigns earlier, President George W. Bush 
told the Republican National Convention in 2004 that “[a]nother drag on 
our economy is the current tax code, which is a complicated mess, filled 
with special interest loopholes, saddling our people with more than 6 billion 
hours of paperwork and headache every year.”3  In 1985, President Ronald 
Reagan spoke to the nation, telling his listeners that he had “proposed a 
sweeping new reform that will . . . reduce the many special tax privileges.”4  
President Jimmy Carter attempted similar reforms, telling the Democratic 
 
 1. President Obama’s Acceptance Speech (Full Transcript), WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 
2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-07/politics/35506456_1_applause-obama
-sign-romney-sign/2. 
 2. Mitt Romney, Republican Debate Transcript, Tampa, Florida, January 2012, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/us-election-2012/republican-
debate-transcript-tampa-florida-january-2012/p27180. 
 3. President Bush’s Acceptance Speech to the Republican National Convention, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 2, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57466-2004Sep2.
html. 
 4. Address to the Nation on Tax Reform, 1 PUB. PAPERS 705 (June 1, 1985). 
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National Convention in 1976 that “[i]t is time for a complete overhaul of 
our income tax system.”5 
Going still further back in time, in 1974, President Gerald Ford supported 
a “tax reform bill [that would raise revenue with] . . . a windfall tax, profits 
tax on oil producers, and by closing other loopholes.”6  Addressing 
Congress in 1961, President John F. Kennedy said that “[i]t will be a major 
aim of our tax reform program to . . . [broaden] . . . the tax base and 
[reconsider] . . . the rate structure.  The result should be a tax system that is 
more equitable, more efficient and more conducive to economic growth.”7 
In their appeals for tax reform, these leaders from both sides of the aisle, 
including both candidates in the 2012 presidential election, all advocated 
“broadening the income tax base,” which entails subjecting more income to 
tax by eliminating tax preferences.8  These preferences usually take the 
form of exclusions, deductions, credits, and special rates, many of which 
are the hated tax “loopholes” so bemoaned in popular and academic 
commentary alike. 
Broadening the income tax base allows lawmakers to lower baseline 
income tax rates for hundreds of millions of citizens without losing 
revenue.  This is because a large tax base subject to a low rate can raise the 
same amount of revenue as a smaller tax base subject to a higher rate.  If the 
tax code9 gains exclusions, deductions, credits, and special rates, lawmakers 
must raise rates to maintain revenue levels.  Conversely, cutting tax 
preferences allows lawmakers to lower tax rates.  In this way, “tax 
reform”—broadening the tax base by excising loopholes—gives politicians 
a chance to offer widespread benefits for huge numbers of constituents.  
Lawmakers can accomplish tax reform incrementally, cutting one tax 
loophole at a time, or take a comprehensive approach, slashing large 
bundles of preferences at once. 
As popular as this goal is across the political spectrum, it is nearly 
impossible to accomplish.  “As appealing as the concept sound[s],” wrote 
journalists Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray in the 1980s, “few . . . 
thought it could be done.”10  Observers from popular-press and academic 
perspectives alike have used the word “impossible” to describe tax 
 
 5. President Jimmy Carter, “Our Nation’s Past and Future”:  Address Accepting the 
Presidential Nomination at the Democratic Nat’l Convention in N.Y.C. (July 15, 1976), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25953. 
 6. Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Economy, 2 PUB. PAPERS 228 (Oct. 8, 
1974). 
 7. Special Message to the Congress on Taxation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 290 (Apr. 20, 1961). 
 8. See C. Eugene Steuerle, Tax Reform, Federal, TAX POL’Y CENTER, http://www.tax
policycenter.org/taxtopics/encyclopedia/Tax-Reform.cfm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 9. The phrase “tax code” refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, 
found in Title 26 of the U.S. Code.   
 10. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:  
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 13 (1987). 
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reform.11  As late as the summer of 2012, a popular Washington Post 
blogger titled a post, Tax Reform Is Going To Be Really, Really Hard.12  
Further, as hard as tax reform is to enact, it is even harder to maintain.  
Even the few tax reform packages that have become law have fallen apart 
within several years of passage.13  No matter how many powerful figures 
from both sides of the aisle support tax reform, getting it done successfully 
remains elusive.  I call this problem federal tax lawmaking “paralysis.” 
This Article proposes a partial solution to this seemingly intractable 
problem.  Federal tax lawmaking paralysis arises because tax reform 
distributes its costs and benefits in ways that doom it to failure.  In 
particular, as I will discuss, federal tax reform has highly concentrated costs 
and extremely diffuse benefits.  Political science theory predicts that laws 
with concentrated costs and diffuse benefits will not succeed.  Viewed from 
this perspective, tax reform’s difficulties are not surprising.  This 
perspective also reveals, however, that tax reformers can overcome federal 
tax lawmaking paralysis by distributing tax reform’s costs and benefits 
differently. 
How states have structured their tax laws makes evident how reformers 
might do this.  In particular, many states earmark14 specific taxes for 
specific programs that benefit concentrated groups.  As a result, these 
concentrated groups work to protect those taxes.  In this way, the cost-
benefit allocation that paralyzes federal income tax lawmaking would not 
present a problem for earmarked taxes.  In fact, examining specific 
earmarked taxes shows that many of them have attracted defenders who can 
guard against would-be preferences and loopholes.  For this reason, 
earmarking tax revenues for particular purposes offers a path out of tax 
lawmaking paralysis and creates opportunities for genuine tax reform. 
This Article proceeds in two parts.  Part I explores federal tax lawmaking 
paralysis in detail and explain the ways in which it has come to pervade the 
U.S. income tax system.  Part II demonstrates how the earmarking 
mechanism can allow tax lawmakers to escape this paralysis.  Part II.A 
describes how states have employed the earmarking device.  Part II.B 
explains how this device addresses the tax lawmaking paralysis problem.  
Part II.C discusses how to address the risks of earmarking.  Part II.D 
 
 11. See id.; David R. Beam, Timothy J. Conlan & Margaret J. Wrightson, Solving the 
Riddle of Tax Reform:  Party Competition and the Politics of Ideas, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 193, 
194 (1990). 
 12. Ezra Klein, Tax Reform Is Going To Be Really, Really Hard, WONKBLOG (Aug. 10, 
2012, 9:05 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/08/10/tax-
reform-is-going-to-be-really-really-hard/. 
 13. See ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK:  WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY 
CHANGES ARE ENACTED 35–55 (2008); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns:  
A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261 (2002); Michael J. Graetz, 
Reflections on the Tax Legislative Process:  Prelude to Reform, 58 VA. L. REV. 1389 (1972). 
 14. “Earmarking” a tax’s revenues means designating a tax’s revenues for a particular 
purpose.  The term “earmark” also refers to an unpopular form of federal special interest 
spending. See generally Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress:  Earmark Rules and 
Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (2009). 
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discusses several situations in which the earmarking has effectively 
overcome tax lawmaking paralysis.  These situations include four case 
studies that I have developed using archival material on state tax laws.  
These case studies show how state-level earmarked taxes have in fact 
successfully evaded the cost-benefit allocation that gives rise to tax 
lawmaking paralysis. 
I.  FEDERAL TAX LAWMAKING IS PARALYZED 
Ezra Klein, a prominent economic commentator, recently made the 
following observation about tax reform: 
As polarized as Washington is over tax and budget issues, a base-
broadening, rate-lowering tax-code overhaul has become the one policy 
every wonk in town can agree on.  It formed the core of the Simpson-
Bowles deficit-reduction plan,15 as well as the Domenici-Rivlin 
proposal.16  It was the cornerstone of the supercommittee’s failed 
negotiations.17  It has been talked up by Sen. Max Baucus, the top Senate 
Democrat on tax issues, and by Rep. Dave Camp, the Republican who 
heads the tax-writing House Ways and Means Committee.  Romney, 
President Barack Obama and House Budget Committee Chairman Paul 
Ryan have all endorsed the idea.18 
Yet, Klein went on to note that each of these Washington movers and 
shakers has been paralyzed in his efforts to reform the tax code.19  Why 
does the tax system face this paralysis?  The following section will first 
describe the paralysis problem and then turn to explain why this problem 
persists. 
A.  Federal Tax Lawmaking Paralysis Throughout Recent U.S. History 
Tax reformers in the United States have not failed for lack of trying.  Yet 
their endeavors make for a near-tragic narrative.  As Birnbaum and Murray 
wrote in 1987, “[t]he [then-]seventy-three-year history of the income tax 
had been a story of steady erosion in the tax base, with more and more 
loopholes being added and few being taken away.”20  Perhaps the most 
 
 15. This is the report issued from President Obama’s bipartisan National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, or, in popular parlance, “deficit reduction commission,” 
convened on November 10, 2010. See Co-Chairs’ Proposal, FISCALCOMMISSON.GOV, http://
www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/CoChair_Draft.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 16. This debt reduction report came out of the Bipartisan Policy Center, founded in 2007 
by Republican senators Bob Dole and Howard Baker and Democratic senators Tom Daschle 
and George Mitchell. See About the Bipartisan Policy Center, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CENTER, 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/about (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 17. The Budget Control Act of 2011 created this bipartisan Joint Select Committee on 
Deficit Reduction.  For a description of this “supercommittee” and its members, see Chris 
Good, Meet the Super Committee, ATLANTIC (Aug. 11, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/08/meet-the-super-committee/243495/. 
 18. Klein, supra note 12. 
 19. Id.  
 20. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 13. 
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remarkable part is the reformers’ unwillingness to abandon their cause in 
the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles. 
The first president to undertake serious tax reform efforts was President 
John F. Kennedy.21 For the highest tax policymaking position in his 
administration, President Kennedy selected Stanley Surrey, a Harvard law 
professor and dedicated opponent of tax loopholes and, in fact, of most uses 
of the tax code for nonrevenue-raising purposes.22  Interest groups strongly 
opposed the appointment, unleashing a “storm of protest.”23  Senator Harry 
Byrd, chair of the Senate Finance Committee (the Senate committee 
responsible for tax legislation), let Surrey know that loophole-closing 
reform legislation would certainly die before the committee due to interest 
group opposition.24  As a result, in the early part of President Kennedy’s 
administration, his “reform efforts wilted.”25  He tried again in 1963, 
proposing many of Surrey’s loophole closers, but the Congressional tax-
writing committees killed all of these proposals.26 
The next serious tax reform efforts emerged in the late 1960s.  In 1967, 
the Treasury Department began working on a major tax reform package.  
The Treasury released it in 1969, timed to coincide with a speech from 
Treasury Secretary Joseph Barr “warning of a ‘tax revolt’ based on the 
inequities in the tax code, particularly the ‘loopholes’ that permitted the 
very rich to avoid taxation.”27  Perhaps as a result, in 1969, Congress finally 
passed a piece of tax reform legislation, the Tax Reform Act of 1969.28  
Although this law successfully excised a number of tax loopholes, “the 
reform victory was short-lived.”29  In the years that immediately followed, 
“subsequent legislation reopened most of the closed loopholes.”30  Tax 
reform’s prospects worsened in 1974 when Representative Wilbur D. Mills, 
the powerful chair of the House’s tax-writing committee—the House Ways 
and Means Committee—resigned from the House after a sex scandal.31  
Mills had been a committed advocate of tax reform and had worked hard to 
“constrain the growth of the tax-break system.”32  After his resignation, 
however, the tax legislative process and its rules became increasingly 
receptive to interest group participation.33  According to political scientist 
Eric Patashnik, “[t]he immediate winners from these changes were 
lobbyists, who found it easier to obtain special tax benefits for their 
 
 21. See  JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
155–56 (1985). 
 22. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 14. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. WITTE, supra note 21, at 166. 
 28. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
 29. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 37. 
 30. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 14. 
 31. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 37. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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clients.”34  In this period, new special preferences flooded the tax code.  
Even the so-called Tax Reform Act of 1976 added a variety of loopholes 
and made the tax code “more, not less, complex.”35 
This deluge prompted then-presidential candidate Jimmy Carter to 
propose, as a key plank of his 1976 campaign platform, “comprehensive, 
total tax reform” that would “eliminate hundreds of tax breaks and greatly 
reduce the tax rate.”36  Proposing tax reform in 1978, President Carter told 
Congress that “[f]undamental reform of our tax laws is essential and should 
begin right now. . . . constitut[ing] a major step towards sustaining our 
economic recovery and making our tax system fairer and simpler.”37  
President Carter’s proposal “followed very closely the classic formulation 
for tax reform” and “advocated broadening the tax base by eliminating or 
tightening tax reduction provisions; [to] . . . simplify the tax system” and 
lower rates.38  Although most tax policy experts applauded President 
Carter’s plan and found his case for reform “extremely powerful, most 
knowledgeable observers believed the prospects for its adoption were 
exceedingly dim.”39  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Congress gutted President 
Carter’s reform plans and passed a bill that was “a complete renunciation of 
the Carter tax proposals and any notion of tax reform.”40  Instead, the 
would-be tax reform package, enacted in 1978, “expand[ed] many existing 
tax breaks and add[ed] numerous new provisions targeted to help farmers, 
teachers, native Alaskans, railroads, record manufacturers, the Gallo winery 
of California, and two Arkansas chicken farmers.”41  The period that 
followed “signaled a new era in tax policy, the triumph of a broad coalition 
of business lobbyists who came together under the rubric of ‘capital 
formation,’” and stuffed the tax code full of new loopholes and industry-
specific—and, in some cases, company-specific—preferences.42  Congress 
passed several tax bills during this period, but none envisioned major base-
broadening reform.43 
Then, the Tax Reform Act of 198644 (1986 Act) arrived.  In 1986, the 
stars aligned to create what multiple observers have called a political or 
legislative “miracle.”45  Political entrepreneurs from both sides of the aisle, 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. WITTE, supra note 21, at 196. 
 36. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 15. 
 37. Economic Report and Tax and Budget Messages:  Remarks at the Signing 
Ceremony, 1 PUB. PAPERS 123 (Jan. 20, 1978). 
 38. WITTE, supra note 21, at 205. 
 39. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 38. 
 40. WITTE, supra note 21, at 213. 
 41. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 16. 
 42. Id. 
 43. E.g., Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 
324 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C). 
 44. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
 45. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 285; Michael J. Graetz, The Truth About 
Tax Reform, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 617, 619 (1988). 
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including President Ronald Reagan, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, 
White House Chief of Staff James Baker, Senator Bob Packwood, Senator 
Bill Bradley, Representative Jack Kemp, and Representative Dan 
Rostenkowski, “employed virtually every strategy in the book”46 to pass a 
meaningful tax reform bill that was, in President Reagan’s words, “a 
triumph for the American people and the American system.”47  To pass the 
1986 Act, Congress and the Reagan Administration exerted massive effort 
in the face of major interest group resistance to excise from the tax code 
hundreds of loopholes and special-interest tax preferences and to use the 
resulting increase in revenue to cut tax rates substantially across the 
board.48  Celebrating the legislative achievement in the 1986 Act’s signing 
statement, President Reagan cited a Washington Post headline:  “The 
Impossible Became the Inevitable.”49 
The 1986 Act was a remarkable piece of legislation indeed, distinguished 
by the “sheer number of credits and deductions scrapped,”50 including high-
revenue items such as tax preference for capital gains, large breaks for the 
oil and gas industries, deductions for state and local sales taxes and interest, 
favorable rules for business entertainment, and a number of provisions that 
had previously allowed tax shelter activity.51  All of this loophole-closing 
allowed Congress to replace the preexisting multilevel rate structure, which 
had a top marginal rate of 50 percent, with a simple rate schedule with just 
two rates:  15 percent and 28 percent.52  As a result, the 1986 Act gave four 
out of five individual taxpayers tax cuts.53  In the wake of the 1986 Act, 
commentators from the popular and academic presses alike rushed to study 
this “legislative miracle.”54  Scholars of tax policy and of politics wanted to 
understand how a few political entrepreneurs had overcome such substantial 
interest group resistance to remove so many preferences and loopholes at 
once. 
 
 46. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 213 (1990); David 
E. Rosenbaum, A Tax Bill for the Textbooks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at D16. 
 47. Negotiators Formally OK New Tax Bill, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 17, 1986, § 1, at 1. 
 48. See generally BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10; Beam, Conlan & Wrightson, 
supra note 11; Rosenbaum, supra note 46 (discussing the difficulties of passing the 1986 
Act). 
 49. Remarks on Signing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1414 (Oct. 22, 
1986). 
 50. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 43. 
 51. Pub. L. No. 99-514, tits. I.D–I.E, III, IV.B, § 411–413, 100 Stat. 2085, 2113–21, 
2216–21, 2225–27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 52. PATASHNIK, supra note 13, at 40. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 10, at 285; TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, MARGARET 
T. WRIGHTSON & DAVID R. BEAM, TAXING CHOICES:  THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM (1990); 
Beam, Conlan & Wrightson, supra note 11, at 202; Dennis Coyle & Aaron Wildavsky, 
Requisites of Radical Reform:  Income Maintenance Versus Tax Preferences, 7 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 11–17 (1987); James M. Verdier, The President, Congress, and Tax 
Reform:  Patterns over Three Decades, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 114, 121–23 
(1988). 
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To this day, observers from a variety of political perspectives recognize 
the 1986 Act as a major legislative accomplishment.  For instance, Robert 
McIntyre, head of the left-leaning Citizens for Tax Justice recently said 
that, with the 1986 Act, 
Congress approved and the president signed what many called the most 
monumental tax reform bill in American history.  Six million low-income 
families were taken off the income tax rolls, and taxes were reduced for 
80 percent of middle-income Americans.  And the well-off freeloaders, 
both corporate and individual, were told to start paying again.55 
President Reagan’s chief economic adviser, Harvard economist Martin 
Feldstein, also recently applauded, “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a 
powerful, positive force for the American economy.”56  He continued, 
heralding that “[e]qually important, as we look back on it after 25 years, we 
. . . see that it taught us . . . that politicians with very different political 
philosophies on the right and on the left could agree on a major program of 
tax rate reductions and tax reform.”57 
Since 1986, however, the miracle of the 1986 Act has almost entirely 
fallen apart.  No sooner had the bill passed than members of Congress and 
their constituencies hurried to refill the tax code with loopholes and 
preferences.  Consequently, tax rates again started to rise.  Between 1986 
and 2010, the number of tax preferences, many of which are quite narrowly 
targeted, has rapidly increased, along with the share of GDP that those 
preferences represent.58  Tax historian Joseph Thorndike summarized the 
reigning scholarly consensus when he recently wrote of the 1986 Act that 
the law’s achievements began to erode almost immediately.  In the early 
1990s, persistent deficit worries prompted lawmakers to raise rates, 
especially on high-income taxpayers.  These same fiscal pressures 
prompted a surge of tax expenditures, as lawmakers cast about for ways to 
spend money without looking like they were doing it.  Ultimately, the 
high-minded ideals of traditional tax reform proved no match for the 
resurgent political traditions of American democracy.  The anomaly of 
[the] 1986 [Act]—like an episode of sunspots—was over.59 
New York University tax scholar Daniel Shaviro echoed this view when, 
upon the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1986 Act, he observed how “the 
grand bargain of base broadening for rate reduction,” has, in the years since 
1986, “slowly unraveled.”60  On the same anniversary, Michael Graetz of 
Yale and Columbia similarly pointed out that “[t]he 1986 tax reform gave 
 
 55. Robert S. McIntyre, Remembering the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 133 TAX NOTES 351, 
356 (2011). 
 56. Martin Feldstein, The Tax Reform Act of 1986:  Comments on the 25th Anniversary, 
133 TAX NOTES 343, 343 (2011). 
 57. Id. 
 58. SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE:  HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 20 (2011). 
 59. Joseph J. Thorndike, 1986?  Who Cares?, 133 TAX NOTES 349, 349 (2011). 
 60. Daniel N. Shaviro, 1986-Style Tax Reform:  A Good Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 
131 TAX NOTES 817, 818 (2011). 
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our income tax a good cleansing, but its ink had hardly dried before 
Congress started adding new tax breaks and raising rates.”61  In The 
Washington Post, journalist Jeffrey Birnbaum, chronicler of the 1986 Act’s 
passage, recently wrote an article entitled Historic Tax Code Changes 
Eroded Since 1986.62  In it, he bemoaned that, 
while vestiges of the historic measure remain, the tax code has been 
allowed to revert in many ways to its pre-1986 form and politicians of 
both parties are eager to push it back further.  It has been repopulated with 
dozens of targeted tax breaks and its rates have not only gone up, but the 
number of brackets have multiplied.63   
He quoted former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Mark 
Weinberger explaining what has gone wrong:  “Unfortunately, as tax bills 
wind through Congress, special interests get to them.”64  Along similar 
lines, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and IRS Commissioner 
Fred T. Goldberg Jr. recently testified before Congress:   
The [Tax Reform] Act [of 1986] did indeed broaden the base and lower 
rates, and was an improvement over prior law in important respects.  But 
whatever those gains may have been, they were transitory at best.  The tax 
system today is grotesquely complicated.  It is perceived as unfair from 
every point on the political spectrum—from the most liberal Democrat to 
the most conservative Republican.  It has caused gross distortions in the 
allocation of resources, and has played a significant role in eroding our 
competitive position in a global economy.65 
Patashnik, in his study of how legislatures succeed or fail at maintaining 
reforms over long periods of time, makes a case study of the 1986 Act, 
using it as a classic example of an unsustainable reform.  He writes, “A key 
test of the durability of a reform is whether subsequent politicians who were 
not official parties to the bargain feel constrained by it.”66  This test is one 
that the 1986 Act emphatically failed.  Following President Reagan, 
President George H.W. Bush called for reinstating the preferential rate on 
capital gains and blessed a series of additional tax preferences, most notably 
for oil exploration and small business, “signaling to lobbyists that his 
Administration was in the tax-break business.”67  Between 1987 and 1998, 
eight in ten members of Congress sponsored or cosponsored legislation to 
provide special treatment for particular industries, amounting to more than 
700 tax bills introduced in the House of Representatives or the Senate 
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during this period.68  Almost all of these bills proposed new preferences 
rather than cutting old ones.69  This trend continued into the next decade, 
with the American Jobs Creation Act of 200470 creating particular 
provisions, among many others, for “tackle box makers, Native Alaskan 
whaling captains, restaurant owners, Hollywood producers, makers of bows 
and arrows, NASCAR track owners, and importers of Chinese ceiling 
fans.”71 
According to Patashnik’s analysis, this reversal occurred because the 
1986 Act, the one truly meaningful tax reform bill ever to pass Congress, 
failed to alter the “political dynamic” of tax lawmaking.72  He cites 
prominent economist Milton Friedman, who predicted soon after the 1986 
Act’s passage that “[n]othing has changed to prevent the process that 
produced our present tax system from starting over.  As lobbyists get back 
into action, and as members of Congress try to raise campaign funds, old 
loopholes will be reintroduced and new ones invented.”73  He points out 
that, following the 1986 Act, most of the interest groups that had opposed 
the legislation were still powerful and had plenty of time and resources left 
to devote to expressing their opposition and attempting to reverse what 
Congress had done in 1986.74  Even interest groups that had supported the 
1986 reform started to hack away at it as soon as they needed a tax 
preference.75  One prominent lobbyist described the common post-1986 
attitude among interest groups as follows:  “If you can have your cake and 
eat it, too, and have no change in the [lowered] rates and get goodies . . . 
well, why not?”76 
Further, the members of Congress who depended on tax-related 
campaign donations continued to do so.  Seats on the tax-writing 
committees remained reliable sources of campaign funds.77  When 
Congress was writing the 1986 Act, members of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, which handles tax legislation, received on average a 24 
percent increase in contributions during the 1985–86 cycle.78  Rather than 
decline in the face of a newly reformed tax code with fewer loopholes, that 
figure only continued to increase after that cycle.79 
In 2005, tax reform supporter President George W. Bush appointed a 
prominent bipartisan commission on tax reform.  The commission strongly 
supported classic rate-lowering, base-broadening reform in the style of the 
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1986 Act.  Explaining reasons for that recommendation, the members of the 
commission wrote: 
Since the 1986 tax reform bill passed, there have been nearly 15,000 
changes to the tax code—equal to more than two changes a day.  Each 
one of these changes had a sponsor, and each had a rationale to defend it.  
Each one was passed by Congress and signed into law. . . .  In retrospect, 
it is clear that frequent changes to the tax code, no matter how well-
intentioned, ultimately undermine the integrity of the code in real and 
significant ways.80 
The commission went on to advocate a detailed series of reforms, including 
eliminating such large preferences as the ones for home mortgage interest 
and employer-provided health insurance.81  The affected interest groups, 
including realtors and life insurance firms, jumped into action to oppose the 
proposal, however, and none of the commission’s proposals became law.  
Similarly, despite the fact that President Obama has made tax reform a 
plank of both his 2008 and 2012 presidential campaigns and has proposed 
major loophole-closing reforms in each of his budgets since winning office, 
his tax reform plans have also gone nowhere.82 
Perhaps in part because the income tax has been so difficult to reform, it 
remains unpopular with Americans, and most favor cutting it.  For example, 
a recent poll asked respondents, “It is now agreed that, because the United 
States is in a recession and at war, the federal government will be in a 
deficit for the next few years.  Given this, please tell me whether you would 
favor or oppose . . . providing tax cuts for middle- and low-income 
individuals.”83  In response, 80 percent of survey participants favored tax 
cuts, with another 4 percent answering “not sure” or “it depends.”84  
Without the deficit prompt, the number of respondents favoring cuts rises to 
87 percent.85 
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As for the basis of this attitude, tax scholars have linked the income tax’s 
unpopularity to the fact that taxpayers do not understand what the tax’s 
revenues fund.  Professor Graetz writes: 
Recently retired congressman Beryl Anthony of Arkansas clearly linked 
anti-government sentiment and tax resistance:  “The voters clearly believe 
government is not giving anywhere close to a dollar’s worth of value for a 
dollar’s worth of taxes.”  The singer and songwriter Richie Havens 
captured this sentiment more graphically when he said, “We should pay 
for what we get, not for what we don’t get.  What we don’t get is just 
about everything.”86 
B.  Understanding Federal Tax Lawmaking Paralysis 
In light of the subsequent history of the 1986 Act, the federal tax system 
presently appears completely paralyzed when it comes to reform.  
Observers agree that passing the 1986 Act was a political miracle, the likes 
of which have never otherwise happened in the income tax’s ninety-nine 
year history.87  But even that miracle did nothing to overcome this paralysis 
in any sustained manner.  Reform happened, fell apart, and seems unlikely 
to happen again any time soon.  While politicians continue to promise tax 
reform, its prospects seem very dim. 
While the tax literature to date devotes substantial time to studying the 
details of different federal tax reform packages,88 it offers no theoretical 
framework for understanding why federal tax reform lawmaking is 
paralyzed.  For this reason, the tax literature has no solution to tax 
lawmaking paralysis.  The existing scholarship has a great deal to say about 
the costs and benefits of different reform proposals that have, or perhaps 
should have, been tried.89  Existing scholarship also has a great deal to say 
about what tax reform should look like going forward, should it pass.90  
Different scholars have different lists, all long, of the loopholes that most 
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need closing, of preferences that have most clearly ceased to serve their 
original purposes, and of breaks whose costs to federal revenue have most 
substantially outpaced their social benefits.91  Nevertheless, no tax 
scholarship proposes a way to overcome this paralysis and to enable some 
of these reforms to become law. 
Understanding this paralysis and what might overcome it requires instead 
a broader look at how interest groups function more generally.  What 
factors particular to federal tax law paralyze its developmental apparatus?  
Interest group theory from political science provides an answer to this 
question.  Theories of regulation, particularly those following Harvard 
political scientist James Q. Wilson’s famous work on the subject, have 
argued that how a law distributes its costs and benefits determines how easy 
that law is to pass and to sustain.92  Significantly, tax scholars have yet to 
consider using this cost-benefit framework in the context of tax lawmaking.  
Yet this framework can explain federal tax lawmaking paralysis and, more 
importantly, suggests a previously neglected path out of that paralysis. 
According to Wilson’s framework, laws have either concentrated costs 
or diffuse costs.93  Laws also have either concentrated benefits or diffuse 
benefits.94  Laws with concentrated costs or benefits focus their costs or 
benefits on a particular, narrow group, such that every member of the group 
receives a substantial cost or benefit.  In contrast, laws with diffuse costs or 
benefits spread those costs or benefits over a broad group so that every 
member of this large set receives a small cost or benefit.  This cost-benefit 
feature of laws is, according to this argument, very important to legal 
development.95  The following diagram demonstrates the four types of 
possible laws under this cost-benefit framework. 
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Table 1:  Cost-Benefit Framework 
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To understand this framework, let’s begin with Quadrant 2 in the table.  
A law from Quadrant 2 has diffuse costs and concentrated benefits and, 
according to the theory, will likely be easy to enact and to expand.  The 
costs of laws of this type are too widely shared to provide any group a 
strong enough incentive to organize against them.96  The benefits are 
concentrated in groups that work hard to organize and advocate for these 
laws.97  Wilson calls the politics of Quadrant 2 “client politics.”98  In this 
quadrant, 
[s]ome small, easily organized group will benefit and thus has a powerful 
incentive to organize and lobby; the costs of the benefit are distributed at 
a low per capita rate over a large number of people, and hence they have 
little incentive to organize in opposition—if, indeed, they even hear of the 
policy.99 
Examples of Quadrant 2 client politics from the nontax areas of public 
policy include “less conspicuous regulatory programs, such as state laws 
that license (and protect) occupations” or “where the government is 
supplying a cash subsidy to an industry or occupation.”100 
Conversely, this theory holds that laws that have diffuse benefits and 
concentrated costs (i.e., Quadrant 3 laws) get nowhere.101  In these cases, 
the particular groups that stand to bear the concentrated costs work hard to 
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resist these laws.  However, no group has a sufficient incentive to fight for 
these laws.  As the author of a subsequent study about this typology 
explains, “the powerful group that would have costs imposed on it [by a 
Quadrant 3 law] will organize in opposition while diffuse unorganized 
beneficiaries have no incentive to push for the policy at issue.”102 
Wilson calls Quadrant 3 politics “entrepreneurial politics” because 
powerful political entrepreneurs must mobilize if a Quadrant 3 policy is 
ever to pass.103  Wilson explains the difficulty of policymaking in Quadrant 
3:  “Since the incentive to organize is strong for opponents of the policy but 
weak for the beneficiaries, and since the political system provides many 
points at which opposition can be registered, it may seem astonishing that 
regulatory legislation of this sort is ever passed.”104  An exception, he 
points out, is consumer-safety regulation of the type that Ralph Nader, “a 
skilled entrepreneur who can mobilize latent public sentiment,” was 
instrumental in passing.105 
Lawmaking in the other two quadrants is neither as easy as that in client 
politics (Quadrant 2) or as difficult as that in entrepreneurial politics 
(Quadrant 3).  Quadrant 1 is home to the “majoritarian politics” of laws 
whose costs and benefits are both widely distributed.106  Here, “[a]ll or 
most of society expects to gain; all or most of society expects to pay.”107  
For this reason, “[i]nterest groups have little incentive to form around such 
issues because no small, definable segment of society (an industry, an 
occupation, a locality) can expect to capture a disproportionate share of the 
benefits or avoid a disproportionate share of the burdens.”108  Quadrant 1 
laws sometimes pass and sometimes do not, depending on whether the 
proposals make it onto the political agenda at all, whether lawmakers agree 
that the law is a legitimate government action, and whether sufficient 
numbers of involved parties agree with the proposed law ideologically.109  
According to Wilson, examples include maintaining a large standing army 
in the years following World War II, the Sherman Antitrust Act,110 and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.111  In all of these cases, “[n]o single 
industry was to be regulated; the nature and scope of the proposed 
regulations were left vague; any given firm could imagine ways in which 
these laws might help them.”112  None of these laws inspired “determined 
industry opposition,” but, to pass, each required mass public support.113 
 
 102. Sharp, supra note 92, at 921–22. 
 103. Wilson, supra note 92, at 370. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 367. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
 111. Id. §§ 41–58; Wilson, supra note 92, at 367.  
 112. Wilson, supra note 92, at 367–68. 
 113. Id. at 368. 
 2013] MAKING IMPOSSIBLE TAX REFORM POSSIBLE 2699 
Quadrant 4 laws, which give rise to “interest group politics,” also have 
mixed success in terms of passage.  Here, “[a] subsidy or regulation will 
often benefit a relatively small group at the expense of another comparable 
small group.”114  With regard to Quadrant 4 laws, “[e]ach side has a strong 
incentive to organize and exercise political influence.”115  Mass opinion 
rarely plays a major role because “[t]he public does not believe it will be 
much affected one way or another; though it may sympathize more with 
one side than the other, its voice is likely to be heard in only weak or 
general terms.”116  In “[m]ost examples of interest-group politics,” neither 
interest group is the total victor and instead, there is “something in the final 
legislation to please each affected party.”117  Labor laws, including 
landmarks such as the Wagner Act118 and Taft-Hartley Act,119 often fall 
into this category.120 
Extending Wilson’s framework to the study of tax legislation offers a 
fruitful way to understand tax lawmaking paralysis.  Wilson’s analysis 
suggests that governmental units are likely to become paralyzed when 
trying to enact Quadrant 3 laws (i.e., laws with diffuse benefits and 
concentrated costs).  Throughout its recent history, federal tax reform 
legislation is indeed of this very type.  Reforming the federal tax code by 
closing loopholes has very diffuse benefits and very concentrated costs—a 
classic Quadrant 3 scenario.  When tax lawmakers opt to close a loophole or 
a series of loopholes, the benefits from doing so are quite diffuse.  Closing 
loopholes allows the federal government either to lower tax rates across the 
board or, in the alternative, to grow its fund of general revenue and to 
distribute this increased revenue across multiple federal programs.  
Accordingly, when lawmakers seek to reform the tax code, potential 
beneficiaries fall into two amorphous groups:  (i) all individuals who pay 
federal taxes and (ii) individuals who may happen to benefit in unspecified 
ways from the growth of general government revenues.  In the 1986 Act, 
where loophole closing allowed for massive rate lowering, the former 
group—taxpayers en masse—constituted the beneficiaries.  The costs of tax 
reform tend to be concentrated, however, landing almost exclusively on 
those groups that have heretofore gained from the particular preferences to 
be pruned from the tax code.121  For example, if a tax reform bill along the 
lines of the 1986 Act were to reverse the tax consequences of the American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, the reform bill’s costs would be concentrated 
among “tackle box makers, Native American whaling captains, restaurant 
owners, Hollywood producers, makers of bows and arrows, NASCAR track 
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owners, and importers of Chinese ceiling fans.”122  At the same time, the 
bill’s beneficiaries would be the diffuse millions of taxpayers whose tax 
rates might fall a little. 
Quadrant 3 lawmaking is difficult.  Laws from this quadrant rarely pass 
and only do so with disproportionate amounts of effort or in very particular 
circumstances.123  Take the example of the tax preference that NASCAR 
track owners received in 2004 in the form of a preferred depreciation 
schedule for NASCAR tracks.124  Whichever member of Congress inserted 
that preferred depreciation schedule for NASCAR tracks into the 2004 Act 
would likely not have even known that NASCAR owners needed a new 
depreciation schedule unless a representative of that group came forward to 
flag the issue.  If, after 2004, a member of Congress attempted to excise this 
established preference, that same interest group would spring into action.  
The group would work with the members of Congress who have NASCAR 
tracks in their districts to preserve the preference.  A NASCAR facility in a 
district presumably brings with it substantial economic stimulus and plenty 
of jobs.  To keep a track in his or her district, a member of Congress would 
likely be willing to work to maintain the special treatment.  In fact, the 
member of Congress could probably find other members who needed to 
preserve similar preferences for their own constituents, and the members 
could agree to watch out for each others’ provisions. 
At the same time, however, no interest group represents the hundreds of 
millions of Americans who either lost a bit of government revenue due to 
the favorable depreciation schedule or whose taxes had to go up to make up 
for the lost revenue.  No interest group staffer will make the rounds of 
congressional offices pleading with members to remove the favorable 
NASCAR depreciation schedule.  Removing the schedule is a classic 
Quadrant 3 project. 
On occasion, tax reform may also fall within Quadrant 1 as a diffuse-
costs, diffuse-benefits law.  Take efforts to reform the federal alternative 
minimum tax (AMT) as an example.  Most scholars, commentators, and 
taxpayers agree that the federal AMT has spiraled out of control, both in 
terms of complexity and in terms of the number of affected taxpayers.125  
Initially designed to make sure that very high-income taxpayers paid a 
minimum amount of tax regardless of available deductions or credits, the 
AMT now hits many middle-income taxpayers and has become 
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extraordinarily complicated.126  Members of Congress and presidential 
candidates from both sides of the aisle have repeatedly called for 
eliminating or at least substantially reforming the AMT.127  Aside from 
annual temporary tinkering, however, the tax remains in place and only 
grows larger and more burdensome with every year.128  
Failure to pass lasting AMT reform is not, however, a Quadrant 3 
problem.  No concentrated interest group is currently benefitting from the 
AMT, so no one has a particular incentive to protect it.  But while the AMT 
hits hundreds of thousands of middle-income Americans a year, its costs are 
diffuse enough such that no one has sufficient incentive to push Congress 
toward resolving the issue. 
Understanding tax reform proposals as Quadrant 3 laws (or, less often, 
Quadrant 1 laws) makes federal tax lawmaking paralysis easier to grasp.  
As the federal tax lawmaking process currently works, no party to this 
process has sufficient incentive to attempt to remove any one of the 
loopholes and preferences currently pervading the tax code.129  The benefits 
of pruning each are simply too diffuse.  As a result, the provisions, with 
their highly concentrated advantages, stay in the tax code indefinitely.  
Members of Congress move along to other bills that incite less opposition 
or provide concrete benefits to another target constituency.  Reform efforts 
remain paralyzed. 
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II.  EARMARKING FEDERAL TAX REVENUES TO OVERCOME PARALYSIS 
Given this federal paralysis problem, the question becomes, what tax 
lawmaking alternatives are out there?  What devices might serve as 
potential vaccines against this paralysis that prevents tax lawmakers from 
enacting widely supported tax reform bills that would provide benefits to 
hundreds of millions of Americans? 
The key is to find a way to move tax reform into one of the quadrants 
where paralysis is less likely to occur.  At first, this task may seem difficult, 
given that tax reform seems like a classic diffuse-benefits situation, usually 
a politically doomed Quadrant 3 law.  Contemporary state-level tax 
lawmaking, however, provides a striking alternative to the federal approach.  
In particular, all fifty states earmark tax revenues for specific purposes.  
With the notable exception of Social Security and Medicare, the federal 
government has not had very much experience with earmarked taxes.  The 
revenue that the federal income tax collects goes into general revenues and 
is not earmarked for any specific purpose. 
When a governmental unit “earmarks” a tax, the governmental unit 
“set[s] aside [the revenue] for a specific purpose or recipient.”130  In 
contrast, nonearmarked taxes go into general revenues, a large pool of 
money that the government later distributes for most of its spending 
programs.  While states vary in their earmarking practices, in 2005, states 
were deriving on average 24 percent of their revenues from earmarked 
taxes.131 
Earmarking tax revenues for particular purposes, or taxing with purpose, 
has the potential to move tax reform legislation into one of the quadrants—
often Quadrant 4, but sometimes Quadrant 2—that does not suffer from 
paralysis problems.  In this part, I explain why this is the case. 
A.  How Earmarking Works 
States earmark tax revenues for a wide range of purposes.  In this section, 
I briefly describe the common types of earmarked taxes and discuss how 
states precommit earmarked revenues. 
Great variety exists among earmarked taxes at the state level.  For 
instance, highways receive motor fuel taxes in forty-five states.132  States 
also fund highways through motor vehicle registrations (eight states) and 
general sales taxes (seven states).133  Forty-six states earmark taxes for local 
governments, most commonly transportation taxes.134  Thirty-five states 
earmark taxes for both K–12 and higher education.135  Earmarked state 
 
 130. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 584 (9th ed. 2009).  Again, I do not use this term to refer 
to the practice of Congressional special-interest spending. 
 131. ARTURO PÉREZ, EARMARKING STATE TAXES 5 (2008). 
 132. Id. at 3. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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taxes dedicate revenues to health and social services in almost as many 
(thirty-four) states.136  Most programs for health services receive funds 
from tobacco taxes (twenty-three states) and alcoholic beverage taxes 
(thirteen states).137  Taxes earmarked for environmental causes receive 
precommitted tax revenue in thirty states.138 
To review the state taxes most frequently earmarked, the motor fuel tax 
mentioned above is the most popular, and is earmarked in all but one 
state.139  Twelve states earmark their motor vehicle registration fees.140  
Also commonly earmarked are taxes on general sales (thirty-five states), 
tobacco (twenty-six states), alcoholic beverages (twenty-three states), and 
insurance and severance (twenty-six states each).141  Twenty states earmark 
some of their income tax.142 
Within this variety, earmarked state taxes fall, broadly speaking, into four 
descriptive categories.  The first kind of earmarked taxes are penalties, 
which tax private activities that the state lawmakers view as 
disproportionately costly to the general public.143  These include taxes on 
cigarettes, alcohol, and gambling.  Sometimes, states use these taxes to 
force smokers, drinkers, and gamblers to finance, for example, antismoking, 
antidrinking, and antigambling efforts, or otherwise to pick up the public 
costs of these activities. 
States also earmark penalty taxes for purposes that have nothing to do 
with the penalized activity.  A few examples of such penalty taxes include 
Alaska’s cigarette tax, earmarked for the rehabilitation, construction, repair, 
and associated insurance costs of state school facilities and for tobacco use 
“education and cessation” (64.1 percent of the revenue collected through 
this tax);144 Tennessee’s mixed-drink tax, earmarked for public schools 
(45.4%) and for cities and counties (45.4%);145 and Idaho’s liquor tax, 
earmarked for cities and counties (48.8%), community colleges (0.9%), 
welfare programs (1.9%), alcohol treatment (3.6%), public schools (3.6%), 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 4. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. VII, § 27; ALA. CODE §§ 28-3-53.2, -74, -184, -200 to         
-205, 28-7-16 (LexisNexis 2003); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30001–30481 (West 2004); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-47.1-701, 24-22-117, 39-22-623 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 27:91–:93, :270, :311–:312, :392–:393, 47:711–:727, :771–:788, :801–:815, :820.1–
:820.4, :1681–:1691, 51:781–:800 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 205.421, 431.301–
.336, 436.2201–.2207 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 240.15, 297F.10 (West 2010); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 35-5-22, 42-7A-63 (2002); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 183.021 (West 2012). 
 144. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 43.50.140 (West 2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D. 
 145. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-3-357, 57-3-302 to -306 (2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, 
app. D. 
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court services (5.4%), and the state Department of Water Resources 
(21.3%).146 
The second type of earmarked taxes functions as service charges, which 
tax users of specific state services or resources.147 These include taxes on 
emergency services and very common taxes on the use of state natural 
resources.  States often channel these taxes to pay for providing the service 
in question or renewing the affected resource, although states sometimes do 
earmark these taxes for unrelated purposes.  One example is Oklahoma’s 
severance tax both on gas, earmarked for school districts (8.2%) and roads 
(8.2%); and on oil, earmarked for school districts (14.9%), roads (7.4%), 
education and student aid (66.9%), and water resources (3.7%), as well as 
for a county fund for road and bridge upkeep (3.7%).148  Another is 
Colorado’s minerals taxes, earmarked for public facilities in areas affected 
by minerals mining (50%), development and conservation of water 
resources (25.4%), geological surveys (1.4%), site cleanup (0.6%), mining 
reclamation (1.8%), a water lawsuit settlement (10.8%), and a low-income 
energy assistance program (5.3%).149 
The third subgroup of earmarked taxes consists of redistributive taxes.150 
These taxes include income and corporate taxes as well as inheritance and 
estate taxes.  Examples include Maryland’s corporate income tax, 
earmarked for public transportation (24%),151 and Illinois’s estate and 
generation-skipping transfer tax, earmarked for counties (6%).152 
Fourth, some earmarked taxes are blanket taxes, imposed on almost 
every citizen or visitor to a state regardless of his or her behavior, use of 
service, or ability to pay.153  These blanket taxes include the most prevalent 
 
 146. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 23-217, -404, -17, 63-10, -25 (2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, 
app. D. 
 147. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 10; ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.51.120, 43.55.211, 
43.75.130, 43.76.025, .150, 43.77.060 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-321, -323, 28-
5801, -5808, -6001, -6008, -8335, -8345, 42-5202, -5304, -5205, -14255, 49-1031, -1036 
(2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-4227 (1997); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 27-25-1 to -27, 27-25-501 
to -525, 27-25-701 to -723 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-705 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 4501, 4503-4, 5727, 5749 (LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 321.015, 
.017, .152,. 324.340 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-13A-12b, -20a, 31-15A-16 
(LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 70.37–.3965, .41–.42, .421, 76.01–.28, 168.12, 
289.645 (West 2010). 
 148. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1001–1024 (2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D. 
 149. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-29-109 (2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D. 
 150. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-1 to 235-69, -92 to -113, 237-1 to -49 (West 2012); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3-7-3 (2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 148.010–.230, .540–.541, .610–.710, 
178.896 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 2351–2385.31 (West 2012); S.C. CODE 
ANN. §§ 8-21-790, 12-16-510 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 10-41-67, 10-43-76, -77 
(2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-103, 67-9-101 to -103 (West 2012). 
 151. MD. CODE ANN. TAX-GEN. §§ 2-613 to -615 (LexisNexis 2010); PÉREZ, supra note 
131, app. D. 
 152. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1–/18 (West 2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D. 
 153. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 260; ALA. CODE §§ 16-16-11, 28-3-281, 38-4-12, 
40-8-3, 40-17-146, -223, 40-21-51, -87, -100 to -107, -23-2, -35, -77, -85 to -88, -100 to -108 
(2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 43.40.010 (West 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-224, 
28-5720, -5852, 42-5008, -5010, -5029 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-5-301 to 302, 19-6-
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of all earmarked taxes:  taxes on motor vehicles and fuel.  Another popular 
blanket tax is levied on tourists to a state, often specifically on the use of 
hotel rooms.  Another extremely common type of earmarked blanket tax is 
the sales and use tax.  The proceeds of these blanket taxes go for countless 
different purposes, many of which have nothing to do with the taxed 
activity.  Examples include Idaho’s sales tax, earmarked for cities and 
counties (11.5%), a multistate tax commission (0.1%), state building 
maintenance (0.5%), water pollution control (0.4%), a county circuit 
breaker (1.3%), and property tax relief (1.5%);154 and Missouri’s sales tax, 
earmarked for school districts (24.6%), soil and water conservation (1.2%), 
state parks (1.2%), conservation of natural resources, (3.1%) and state 
highways (8.2%).155 
All of these earmarked taxes share one key feature:  they precommit tax 
revenues to particular purposes before the government collects the tax.156  
Upon paying the tax, taxpayers know where the revenue is going.  States 
have only rarely attempted to dip into earmarked taxes for nondesignated 
purposes.  Perhaps this is because tax earmarks often give legal recourse to 
intended beneficiaries if lawmakers tamper with the promised revenue pool. 
For instance, Wisconsin Medical Society, Inc. v. Morgan157 considers a 
tax that the state of Wisconsin imposes on health care providers earmarked 
for a medical liability “trust fund.”  If a health care provider has to pay a 
medical liability claim in excess of the provider’s statutorily mandated 
liability insurance, the fund will make up the difference.158  Putting money 
into a fund called a trust fund is quite common among earmarked taxes.  In 
2007, this particular fund had excess money, however, and the state of 
Wisconsin diverted the money to a different medical fund.159  But health 
care providers who paid the tax sued, claiming that the state could not use 
these tax revenues for anything other than their designated purpose.  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in favor of the medical providers.  The 
court held that the medical providers had a property interest in the trust fund 
that “a future legislature is not free to confiscate.”160 
 
301(3)–(4), 301(40), 301(182), 24-11-301, -809, 26-52-316, 26-55-205, -1002 to -1005, -
1201, 26-56-201 to -202, -301, -502, 26-57-604, -610, 26-62-201, 27-70-104, 27-72-305, 27-
206-07 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. §§ 2-1001 to 2-1104 (LexisNexis 2012); 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-65-121, 15-70-204 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105-164.1 to 
.44D, 105-228.28 to .36, 105-449.37 to .139, 105-187.1 to .10 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 12-28-2720, -2750, 12-28-2910, 12-36-2620 to -2630, -2640; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 70.149, 82.04, 82.36, 82.38 (West 2008). 
 154. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3601 to -3641 (2007); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D. 
 155. PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D. 
 156. For more on how earmarked taxes precommit revenues and for a deeper look at the 
topics discussed in the next few paragraphs, see my initial exploration of earmarking in 
Susannah Camic, Earmarking:  The Potential Benefits, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 55 (2006). 
 157. 787 N.W.2d 22 (Wis. 2010). 
 158. Id. at 27. 
 159. Id. at 30. 
 160. Id. at 46. 
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Along the same lines, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reached a 
similar result, based on a contract claim, in Tuttle v. New Hampshire 
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n.161  That case also 
concerned a tax on medical providers earmarked for a governmental fund to 
cover medical liabilities in excess of the providers’ insurance.162  Here, 
New Hampshire diverted excess money from that fund to pay for services 
for medically underserved populations.163  The taxpaying medical providers 
sued, arguing that the state had violated the contract it had with them.  The 
court held that New Hampshire had in fact violated the fund beneficiaries’ 
contractual rights by using the earmarked funds for a purpose other than the 
one intended.164 
Two things are notable about these cases.  First, of course, these cases 
demonstrate that beneficiaries of earmarked tax revenues have legal 
recourse if states ever attempt to take away the earmarked funds.  Second, 
the cases point to the key role that beneficiary interest groups play in the 
politics of earmarked taxes.  In both Wisconsin Medical Society and Tuttle, 
interest groups—the Wisconsin Medical Society, the New Hampshire 
Medical Society, and the American Medical Association—took active parts.  
As soon as the states attempted to divert the earmarked revenues away from 
these interest groups, their members sprung into action and got the money 
returned.  These interest groups filed suit, submitted amicus briefs, and 
coordinated the multiple plaintiffs.  In both cases, the interest groups 
exerted these efforts even though the trust funds in question were running 
surpluses.  In neither case did the trust fund actually deny a medical 
provider’s claim.  Using even excess funds for the nonearmarked purpose 
was sufficient to spur the interest groups to action.  These cases point to a 
crucial feature of earmarked taxes:  their beneficiaries protect them.  This 
feature allows earmarking to address tax lawmaking paralysis, which I 
discuss in the next section. 
B.  How Earmarking Overcomes Tax Lawmaking Paralysis 
Part I of this Article described a seemingly intractable problem.  Federal 
tax lawmaking efforts become paralyzed because proposed tax reforms 
have concentrated costs and diffuse benefits.  Laws with diffuse benefits are 
extraordinarily difficult to pass and to sustain.  Of these frequently stalled 
diffuse-benefits laws, the ones that also have concentrated costs have even 
more trouble.  As a result, reform bills that close loopholes and eliminate 
narrowly targeted preferences, while helping hundreds of millions of 
Americans, cannot move out of Congress.  On the rare occasion that such a 
bill makes it through and becomes law, its accomplishments unravel almost 
immediately after. 
 
 161. 992 A.2d 624, 636–38 (N.H. 2010). 
 162. Id. at 630. 
 163. Id. at 633. 
 164. Id. at 641. 
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Unlike federal tax reforms with their diffuse benefits, however, 
earmarked taxes often have concentrated benefits.  For this reason, many of 
the earmarked state taxes fall into the two concentrated-benefits 
quadrants—Quadrants 2 and 4.  While certain earmarked taxes fall into 
each quadrant of the cost-benefit matrix, a substantial number belong in the 
ones with concentrated benefits.  For example, state alcohol taxes 
earmarked for programs at the county level concentrate benefits in the 
residents of that county.  State taxes that are earmarked for education 
concentrate benefits in part in students represented by educational advocacy 
groups and in teachers’ unions.  State taxes earmarked for replenishing 
natural resources benefit the groups that use and enjoy those resources.  As 
a result, these earmarked taxes and the programs they fund have identifiable 
constituencies to support them. 
Very often, in fact, earmarked state taxes fall into the most politically 
advantageous concentrated benefit/diffuse cost quadrant—Quadrant 2.  
Many of these state taxes fall on extremely broad-based groups (people who 
buy things, people who earn income, people who use the roads, etc.), while 
benefits accrue to relatively narrower groups.  Among the many examples 
are blanket taxes like Kansas’s motor vehicle tax, earmarked for the 
construction of buildings at public universities (39.5%) and mental 
institutions (18.6%),165 and income taxes like Michigan’s, earmarked for 
K–12 public education (32.5%).166 
States also have a number of Quadrant 4 tax laws, which have 
concentrated costs and concentrated benefits.  These laws include, among 
many others, user fees like Mississippi’s oil (33.1%) and gas (22.6%) 
severance taxes, earmarked for the source counties of the oil and gas.167  
These Quadrant 4 laws also include a number of penalty taxes such as 
Washington’s beer and wine tax, earmarked for cities (28.3%), counties 
(7.1%) Washington State University’s research on wine and grapes (0.2%), 
state Wine Commission operations (0.2%), border cities and counties 
(0.2%), state health care programs (12.8%), and drug enforcement and 
education (13.3%).168 
The table below shows the cost-benefit framework described in Part II 
with some examples of earmarked state taxes that fit into each quadrant. 
  
 
 165. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5109 (West 2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D. 
 166. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.51 (West 2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app. D. 
 167. MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-25-501 to -525, -701 to -723 (West 2012); PÉREZ, supra note 
131, app. D. 
 168. WASH. REV. CODE § 66.24.210, .290 (2012); PÉREZ, supra note 131, app D. 
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Table 2:  Cost-Benefit Framework with Earmarked Tax Examples 
 
 Costs 
Benefits  Diffuse costs Concentrated costs 
Diffuse 
benefits 
(1) Diffuse costs, 
diffuse benefits 
Nebraska’s sales 
tax earmarked for 
state, city, and 








costs, diffuse benefits 
Alaska’s corporate 
income tax on oil and 
gas companies 
















earmarked for the 




tax earmarked for 







Minnesota’s tax on 
mining operations 
earmarked for the 
University of 
Minnesota 
Texas’s tax on 
attorneys earmarked 
for public schools 
 
 
The earmarked taxes in the concentrated-benefits quadrants, Quadrants 2 
and 4, offer a particularly clear path out of tax lawmaking paralysis at the 
federal level—where, once again, they have yet to be substantially tried.  
Rather than impose a cost on a politically powerful or popular constituency 
to provide a benefit spread across an entire population, these taxes do the 
reverse.  They spread a cost across an entire population, in many cases to 
benefit a concentrated group.  As a result, these laws would be much less 
likely to give rise to tax lawmaking paralysis.  As an initial matter, this 
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cost-benefit theory suggests that these state earmarked tax bases are less 
likely to erode than the federal income tax base.  If an interest group 
proposes an exception from a tax with concentrated benefits, that exception 
will hurt one or more specific interest groups.  That exception would be a 
Quadrant 4 law giving rise to interest group politics.  A suggested exception 
in many earmarked taxes would pit two concentrated groups against each 
other.169  Depending on the circumstances, the beneficiary group might be 
able to stop the exception altogether.  If the exception passed, it would 
likely do less damage to the tax base than it would have had the beneficiary 
group not been there to fight against it.170 
Then, assuming that a special preference does manage to embed itself in 
an earmarked tax with concentrated beneficiaries, a reform bill that 
removed the preference would not be a paralyzed Quadrant 3 law.  Again, it 
would be a Quadrant 4 law, pitting two interest groups against each other.  
Extending this model to the federal level, a member of Congress who would 
propose to close a loophole in a tax benefiting a particular group will likely 
hear from members of that group, who will provide a crucial counterweight 
to the interest group advocating to keep the loophole open. 
To take an example, recall the preferential depreciation schedule that 
Congress gave to NASCAR track owners in 2004.171  Removing that 
special treatment would be a classic doomed Quadrant 3 law.  Any 
lawmaker attempting to eliminate the preference would face a serious 
paralysis problem.  As things now stand, subjecting NASCAR tracks to the 
same depreciation schedule as other similar assets would impose substantial 
costs on a concentrated group, NASCAR track owners, while producing a 
very small benefit for a large but diffuse group, the millions of U.S. citizens 
who would either face higher taxes or lower government revenues due to 
elimination of the loophole. 
In contrast, imagine that Congress had followed the example of several 
states and earmarked the income tax with the NASCAR loophole for a 
particular purpose, such as federal funding for public schools.  Under this 
scenario, if a member of Congress attempted to eliminate the NASCAR 
preference, that proposal would be one that would also raise revenue for the 
public schools.  As a result, education interest groups like public school 
teachers’ unions and advocacy groups for public education would know that 
a pending bill would benefit them (just as they know when a legislature is 
considering an education subsidy).  These interest groups would then 
support the bill and lend assistance to federal legislators trying to eliminate 
the NASCAR loophole. 
 
 169. See Wilson, supra note 92, at 368.  
 170. Id.  Quadrant 4 politics are, in Wilson’s theory, compromise politics. If one group 
manages to pass an exception to a tax benefitting another group, that likely represents a 
compromise between the two groups. The group that allows the exception may not agree to 
the compromise unless the exception is not that big. 
 171. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.  
 2710 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
In fact, some of the education groups might take the initiative and 
approach members of Congress to suggest slicing this preference.  A 
member of Congress who had a particularly powerful teachers’ union in his 
district might hear from a representative from the union demanding that the 
favorable treatment be excised.  The member might know that the union 
lends its money and volunteer assistance only to candidates who are 
responsive to the union and successfully help it accomplish its goals.  For 
this reason, the member would have a strong incentive to try to cut out this 
preference.  The member could then ally himself with other members with 
strong teachers’ union support to propose legislation to that effect and to 
see it through the legislative process.  Of course, some other members of 
Congress with NASCAR tracks in their districts would still have incentives 
to preserve the favorable treatment.  In any case, whether to keep the 
loophole around would no longer be a fight between NASCAR-district 
members and no defined constituency at all.  Instead, the debate would be 
between NASCAR-district members and teachers’ union–district members.  
This balanced interest group competition would prevent paralysis.  This 
example demonstrates why federal tax reformers who are currently 
encountering paralysis may want to consider some of the concentrated-
benefits templates that states have used in their earmarked taxes.  With 
earmarking, Congress can move tax reforms out of the politically doomed 
Quadrant 3 into the more politically promising concentrated-
benefit/concentrated-cost Quadrant 4, earmarking a tax to benefit a 
concentrated group and, in so doing, giving the tax built-in interest group 
protection. 
C.  How To Address Earmarking’s Risks 
Despite the potential advantages to earmarking identified so far, 
increasing the use of earmarking might initially appear to present certain 
risks.  In view of these risks, although the members of Congress may find 
earmarking a useful device for overcoming tax lawmaking paralysis, they 
may not want to switch to funding government programs entirely out of 
earmarked tax revenues.  Setting certain limits on the extent to which 
Congress earmarks revenues may, therefore, be appropriate.  As mentioned 
above, even the state governments, which rely more heavily on earmarking 
than does the federal government, earmark on average only 24 percent of 
tax revenues.172  The following section considers three of the possible risks 
of earmarking, which Congress should weigh along with the potential 
benefits of earmarking discussed above, when deciding whether to earmark 
a particular revenue stream. 
First, the specific manner in which earmarking configures statutory costs 
and benefits may threaten the tax system’s progressivity.  As the cost-
benefit matrix presented above shows, laws with concentrated benefits and 
diffuse costs are easiest to pass.  But individual taxes of this kind are not 
 
 172. PÉREZ, supra note 131, at 5. 
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necessarily progressive.  The current federal income tax is progressive, 
designed so that it “takes a larger percentage of income from high-income 
groups than from low-income groups” and “is based on the concept of 
ability to pay.”173  In contrast, state sales and excise taxes are regressive, 
designed so that “everyone, regardless of income level, pays the same fixed 
amount . . . [which] . . . causes lower-income people to pay a greater 
proportion of their income than higher-income groups pay.”174  Undeniably, 
many earmarked taxes fall into this regressive category. 
Although this fact is an important one, not every earmarked tax poses this 
risk or poses it to a significant degree.  Some earmarked state tax laws are 
actually quite progressive in a broader, more substantive sense of that word.  
They tax groups that are relatively well-off (high earners in some cases, but 
even people who use roads or who buy things) to help groups that are not 
well-off (poor children, indigent sick people).  Thinking in terms of these 
examples, one can imagine federal earmarked taxes that are progressive in 
this same way.  For instance, the federal government could impose a small 
rate increase on the top 25 percent of corporations by earnings to fund 
health care programs for those factory workers who the North American 
Free Trade Agreement has displaced.  In that case, the overall structure of 
the tax would be progressive in its design and effect.  The program would 
tax a very sizeable but well-off group of taxpayers to help a group that is 
smaller and more concentrated but poorer.  For this reason, despite the 
possible risk to progressivity, earmarking also creates opportunities to 
redistribute income in a way that is, broadly speaking, quite progressive. 
A second risk that earmarking could pose is restrictions on legislative 
flexibility.  When a legislature earmarks tax revenues for a particular 
purpose, those revenues are not then available for future use in the general-
revenues pool.  Scholarship on the theory of democracy has rightly 
identified problems with measures that reduce future legislative flexibility.  
Political theorist Stephen Holmes, for example, has lamented the fact that 
political leaders precommit their successors to certain policies in efforts to 
“remove certain decisions from the democratic process, that is, to tie the 
community’s hands.”175  Against this practice, Holmes appeals to the 
founding fathers, citing not only Thomas Paine’s belief that “[e]very age 
and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages and 
generations which preceded it,”176 but also Thomas Jefferson’s famous 
statement that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.”177  Beyond such 
theoretical considerations regarding earmarking, assigning tax revenues to a 
 
 173. Theme 3:  Fairness of Taxes, Lesson 3:  Progressive Taxes, IRS, http://apps.irs.gov/
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CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 196 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1993) 
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 176. Id. at 200. 
 177. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789). 
 2712 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
specific programmatic destination at the time of collection does—as a 
practical matter—reduce a legislature’s ability to repurpose those funds in 
accord with ever-shifting spending priorities. 
These problems show only one side of the picture, however, because 
earmarking need not entirely bind future congressional hands.  This is true 
for two basic reasons.  One:  an earmarked tax does not necessarily extend 
indefinitely in time.  In fact, many states earmark tax revenues for explicitly 
limited periods of time.  For instance, many states earmark revenues to 
service particular debts; and as soon as the state pays off the debt, the 
earmarked tax then expires.  In these cases, legislatures are restricting their 
options only for the stipulated period of time while they accomplish specific 
purposes.  Two:  legislatures always remain free to revise statutes.  For this 
reason, insofar as the members of a legislature later change their minds 
about the destination for certain earmarked tax revenues, nothing prevents 
those legislators from rewriting the tax statute either to modify the 
percentage of the tax allocated for the designated purpose or to eliminate 
the earmarking feature altogether. 
A third risk is that the costs of earmarking will fall on disempowered 
groups.  As described in detail above, earmarked taxes have the advantage 
of giving the organized beneficiaries of a revenue stream a voice in the 
legislative decisions that pertain to that stream.  This being the case, interest 
groups that gain from a particular tax can work to protect that tax.  By the 
same token, the political dynamics of earmarking afford no clear role for 
groups that are politically disempowered.  For this reason, organized 
interest groups may be able to reap the benefits of earmarked taxes while 
politically unorganized constituencies fail to do so. 
Nevertheless, this third risk is by no means unique to earmarked taxes.  
Groups that lack influence in the political process have equivalent 
difficulties in obtaining benefits out of the general-revenue pool.  In fact, in 
the latter case, even if a disempowered group does manage in some year to 
snag a few dollars from the general-revenue pool, the group may have 
trouble holding on to its gains in the competition for those funds in 
subsequent years.  In other words, there is no compelling reason to believe 
that the political dynamics of earmarking handicap powerless groups any 
more than do the political dynamics of the existing tax lawmaking process. 
D.  Earmarking in Practice:  Nonparalyzed Lawmaking 
Part II.B outlined in broad, theoretical terms the way in which 
earmarking taxes for particular purposes addresses tax lawmaking paralysis.  
That section argued, based on interest group theory, that earmarked taxes 
offer a promising path out of the paralysis that has plagued federal tax 
reform efforts.  To assess how well that interest group theory describes 
actual tax lawmaking, the following sections discuss three situations in 
which governments have in fact earmarked revenues, placing the taxes in 
Quadrants 2 or 4.  In each of these situations, interest group dynamics have 
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played out in ways that point to earmarking’s potential effectiveness against 
tax lawmaking paralysis. 
1.  Social Security 
The federal government has little experience with earmarked taxes.  Most 
of the federal government’s earmarked taxes are relatively small, both in 
revenue terms and in terms of the number of affected individuals.178  The 
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federal government does, however, fund one of its largest programs through 
an earmarked tax:  Social Security.  Social Security is a Quadrant 2 law.  It 
imposes costs on a large and diffuse group, American employees and 
employers, to fund a program for a narrower and more concentrated group, 
older Americans.  Social Security’s Quadrant 2 cost-benefit distribution is 
among the factors that have prevented it from having a paralysis problem. 
The federal income tax and the Social Security payroll tax have very 
different histories.  As described in the earlier parts of this Article, for 
decades, the federal income tax base has continued to shrink as special 
preferences erode it and efforts to reverse the trend become paralyzed.179  
In contrast, an advisor to former Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill 
famously called Social Security the “third rail” of American politics, 
explaining that no politician can undermine Social Security without facing 
political death.180  This was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s intent when 
he insisted on funding the program with an earmarked payroll tax.181  In her 
seminal book on the history of Social Security, policy scholar Martha 
Derthick explained that, at the program’s inception, lawmakers proposed to 
fund it like any other federal program, out of general revenues.182  The 
federal Committee on Economic Security, which initially drafted the plans 
for Social Security, proposed to support it with a limited-rate earmarked tax 
in the program’s early years but, once the needs of senior citizens exceeded 
the revenues from that fixed-rate tax, to start turning to general revenues.183  
President Roosevelt, in a manner described as “uncompromising,” opposed 
this idea.184  Roosevelt believed that only an earmarked tax could protect 
his program from attack by future generations.  He told an observer: 
[T]hose taxes were never a problem of economics.  They are politics all 
the way through.  We put those payroll contributions there so as to give 
the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions 
. . . .  With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my 
social security program.185 
Interest groups became immediately attached to the payroll tax.  The 
American Federation of Labor supported the tax from the beginning, telling 
workers that, if the program was “financed with general revenues, they 
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would ‘irresistibly be pulled down to relief standards.’”186  An issue of one 
of the federation’s bulletins urged workers to accept the new tax, saying 
that 
[W]hen the money goes directly out of our pay, . . . people realize that it 
is our insurance and we can have a strong voice in advising on the way 
the insurance system works.  The more social security protection we try to 
build up, the harder it will be for us to get it and to see that it works 
properly unless right in the books it shows that we are paying our 
share.187  
As the program expanded substantially over the rest of the century and into 
the twenty-first, affected interest groups continued to protect the payroll 
tax, preserving the program’s “fundamental popularity.”188  Interest groups, 
particularly organized labor, senior citizens’ groups, and the legendarily 
competent Social Security Administration continued to advocate hard for 
increases in Social Security taxes so that, by the late 1970s, “[p]otential 
opponents of expansion were so conditioned to expect defeat that they 
anticipated expansion and, in anticipating it, made concessions to it.”189 
The Social Security payroll tax has continued to grow and no 
countervailing interest group has made any serious effort to undermine it.  
Whereas the income tax base, as discussed, has hundreds of exceptions and 
special favors, the Social Security wage base has almost none.  Taxpayers 
pay income tax based on their “taxable income,” a figure that is generally 
much smaller than their total earnings because it reflects so many 
carveouts.190  Taxpayers pay Social Security tax on the Social Security 
wage base, which essentially equals their total wage amount up to a certain 
figure without any carveouts.191  Politicians who have suggested cuts to 
Social Security have had no success thus far.  In fact, these lawmakers face 
their own version of a Quadrant 3 paralysis problem.  Lawmakers who want 
to prune Social Security presumably do so in the hopes of reducing the 
burden on the large and diffuse group of working Americans who pay 
Social Security taxes.  Reducing Social Security taxes threatens to impose 
costs on a relatively narrower and politically well-represented group:  the 
elderly.192  This doomed Quadrant 3 plan never progresses. 
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Derthick explains, “politicians . . . in their candid moments acknowledge 
that the social security benefits incorporated in law are sacrosanct.  
Reduction is simply unthinkable, no matter what the method of financing or 
the inflationary effects might be.”193  President Roosevelt understood how 
earmarking afforded Social Security this degree of protection and reduced 
its vulnerability to the political dynamics that have entrenched loopholes in 
the federal tax code.  With hindsight, Derthick agrees with Roosevelt’s 
initial prediction, writing that, “[h]ad social security been . . . financed by 
general revenues, the preceding history would be very different.”194 
2.  Municipal Bonds 
The history of Social Security offers a key example of how earmarking 
has prevented lawmaking paralysis in the one area where the federal 
government has experimented with an earmarked tax.  Given the federal 
government’s limited experience with earmarked taxes, a detailed 
understanding of how they work and how they might address paralysis 
requires examining lower levels of government.  As discussed in Parts II.A–
B, the states have relied heavily on earmarked taxes.  Yet there is little 
scholarship on the subject; only a few scholars in political science have 
studied the mechanism in one particular related form:  local-level municipal 
bonds.  In the next section of this Article, I offer several case studies that 
make a first effort at studying the dynamics of these earmarked state taxes.  
Before turning to the state-level case studies, this Article considers 
municipal bonds and the ways in which the municipal bond literature 
further highlights the earmarking mechanism’s potential to undo tax 
lawmaking paralysis. 
Municipal bonds present an unexpected dynamic that resembles the one 
seen in the context of Social Security lawmaking.  Despite the conventional 
wisdom that voters rarely elect to increase their own taxes and the oft-
repeated understanding that a candidate cannot win public office with a 
promise to raise taxes, voters have never balked at increases in their Social 
Security taxes, as discussed in the previous section.  Similarly, in the 
context of municipal bond issues, voters regularly vote to increase their 
own taxes in certain and concrete ways.  One other feature unites Social 
Security and municipal bonds:  both involve earmarked taxes. 
Local governments rely heavily on municipal bond issues to raise money 
for particular capital projects.  This became especially true in the 1980s and 
1990s after the Reagan Administration cut federal spending for local 
endeavors and began a trend of routing more funds through state capitols 
rather than channeling them directly to local municipalities.195  Bond issues 
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often require voters to approve a tax increase dedicated for a particular 
purpose, typically a specific project.196  Municipal bond issues frequently 
succeed.  In fact, in the context of commonly requested bond issues for 
education, one study showed that only a quarter of school districts have 
ever had a bond issue rejected.197  
Bond issues are generally Quadrant 2 policies with diffuse costs and 
concentrated benefits.  When bond issues pass, all property taxpayers’ taxes 
go up a small amount to finance a project that will help a small, 
concentrated group, such as a defined group of schools.  Affected interest 
groups usually lobby on behalf of the bond issue, making the case about the 
benefits of the particular project at hand.  Scholars have found that these 
interest groups play a key role in bond issues, often distributing information 
about the proposal.198  Studies have shown that voters are more likely to 
vote for a bond issue if they know more about the planned use of the funds, 
especially the ways in which the funds might benefit their community.  
Interest groups can disseminate this information effectively. 
A seminal study showed that bond issues were more likely to pass when 
local leaders recruited neighborhood associations to work on behalf of the 
bonds by touting the benefits that the bonds would have for the individual 
neighborhoods.199  This study concerned a bond referendum in St. Louis 
that sought to impose “nearly a dollar per hundred incremental increase in 
property taxes; an amount of eye popping proportions to many voters.”200  
While bond referenda are often successful, at the time of this study, St. 
Louis had been having trouble passing them due to demographic shifts that 
turned the city’s population into one that generally opposed taxes.201  In the 
referendum considered in the study, St. Louis officials worked to energize 
interest groups around the issue by emphasizing the ways in which the 
proposal concentrated benefits in particular neighborhoods.  The recruited 
neighborhood associations assisted with “a carefully orchestrated 
newspaper and direct-mail campaign for the entire ‘package’ [of proposed 
bonds that] stressed specific neighborhood benefits.”202  In this direct-mail 
campaign, voters received information on street, sidewalk, park, and other 
improvements designed for their immediate vicinity should the bond 
package succeed.203 
This strategy of spurring interest group activity and highlighting the 
concentrated benefits of the proposal proved largely successful.  While only 
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one of the proposed bond issues got the two-thirds vote necessary for 
passage, eight of the ten bonds in the package received majority approval, 
an uptick from previous campaigns that had less heavily emphasized the 
concentrated benefits of the proposals and featured less interest group 
activity.204  Perhaps even more remarkably, this study demonstrated that, 
when tax increases are earmarked for concrete benefits for particular 
segments of a voting population, a majority of even a generally antitax 
voting population may be willing to increase its own taxes to pay for those 
benefits. 
Similarly, a more recent study examined another city that had historical 
trouble with bond issues:  Jackson, Mississippi.205  In this study, Jackson’s 
school superintendent was aware that earlier bond referenda had provided 
little information about the actual destination of the funds.206  The 
superintendent worked to provide voters with additional information about 
the planned uses of the bond money, as had been done in St. Louis.  He and 
other school administrators “put together a bond issue that was actually a 
set of ten ‘mini’ bond issues, a checklist of different items that voters could 
choose to individually support or reject.”207  With the new mini bond issue 
approach, voters could “cast separate votes to air condition and renovate the 
schools, replace portable classrooms, purchase new library books, construct 
new science labs, purchase new computer equipment, and build new athletic 
facilities.”208  “With this novel approach to the ballot, a list of projects 
spread throughout the city, and a clear presentation of the needs of the 
school district,” the superintendent “sought to build a coalition of 
supporters, and he lined up support from civic leaders, The (Jackson) 
Clarion-Ledger, the business community, and even administrators from 
some of Jackson’s private academies.”209  The only opposition to the bond 
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was some “disorganized” griping from a white supremacist group.210  This 
novel approach led to one of the first bond issue victories in recent Jackson 
history, with over half the requested funding approved.211 
Like the St. Louis case, this bond issue demonstrated how earmarked 
taxes can harness the power of interest group dynamics in concentrated-
benefit, diffuse-cost scenarios.  The bonds in question imposed small costs 
on most of the Jackson community and produced substantial benefits for the 
beneficiaries of the proposed education projects.  When the superintendent 
provided information to the community about the concentrated benefits 
available from the earmarked bond revenues, he was able to mobilize 
interest groups in support of the bonds.  With no effective opposition, this 
strategy convinced over 60 percent of a traditionally antitax electorate to 
vote to raise their own taxes to generate revenue for school 
infrastructure.212 
As in the case of Social Security, the experiences of earmarked taxes in 
the bond context differs markedly from the dynamics of federal income tax 
lawmaking.  Part I.A discussed how deeply unpopular the income tax has 
become among taxpayers who believe they are getting nothing in return for 
the taxes they pay.  In contrast, the earmarked taxes studied in the context 
of bond issues generally inspire the opposite sentiment.  When informed 
about the concrete benefits of the earmarked taxes, voters agree to raise 
them, even imposing burdens that the voters themselves know they will 
bear.  Raising revenue through bond issues is not paralyzed.  Federal 
income tax lawmaking is. 
3. Earmarked State Taxes:  Case Studies 
The previous two sections have drawn on the experience gleaned from 
the federal government’s primary venture with earmarked taxes and from 
local bond issues.  Legal scholars and social scientists have studied these 
two situations in some detail, and their research suggests that earmarking 
offers an opportunity to subvert tax lawmaking paralysis. 
No scholarship to date has examined, however, the governmental site in 
which the most, and most diverse, earmarking occurs:  state tax laws.  As 
described in detail in Part II.A–B, states earmark on average 24 percent of 
their revenues for particular purposes and do so in a variety of ways.213  
The following sections take a closer look at several earmarked state taxes 
and their interest group dynamics in an effort to assess their potential for 
addressing tax lawmaking paralysis. 
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To develop these case studies, I compiled a list of the many taxes with 
clearly concentrated benefits from the several hundred earmarked state 
taxes.  From that list, I randomly selected four earmarked state taxes.  Then, 
I conducted archival research about the four taxes.  Using legislative 
history, earlier versions of statutes, reports from legislative committees, 
historical tax-rate data, floor debates from state legislatures, back issues of 
newspapers, and publications from various interest groups, I assembled the 
four case studies that I describe here. 
a.  Colorado’s Tobacco Tax Earmarked for Public Health 
In November 2004, Colorado voters overwhelmingly approved a 
constitutional amendment that would increase state cigarette and tobacco 
taxes (Amendment 35) and earmark the funds for public health, specifically, 
health care for underserved individuals.214  A 1992 Colorado constitutional 
amendment known as the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR) requires that a 
majority of voters approve all tax increases in a statewide election.215  As a 
result, tax increases such as this one require not just legislative approval but 
a referendum.  In this case, faced with such a referendum, 61 percent of 
Coloradans voted for both the tax increase and to earmark the new revenues 
for particular purposes relating to public health.216  These purposes 
included expanding coverage and increasing eligibility in Medicaid and 
Colorado’s Child Health Plan (46 percent of revenue), funding 
comprehensive primary care through community health centers that 
primarily serve the uninsured and indigent (19%), supporting programs 
focusing on tobacco education, prevention, and cessation (16%), and paying 
for programs focusing on prevention, early detection, and treatment of 
cancer and cardiovascular and pulmonary diseases (16%).217 
A coalition of organizations called Citizens for a Healthier Colorado 
sponsored the referendum.218  The member groups included a number of 
potential tax beneficiaries, among them, a children’s advocacy group called 
the Colorado Children’s Campaign, the American Cancer Society, the 
American Heart Association, the American Lung Association, an 
antismoking group called the Colorado Tobacco Education and Prevention 
Alliance, the Colorado Hospital Association, two health-advocacy 
nonprofits called the Colorado Consumer Health Initiative and the Colorado 
Prevention Center, a community health center organization called the 
Colorado Community Health Initiative, and the National Jewish Children’s 
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Hospital.219  The chairs of Citizens for a Healthier Colorado were chairs of 
a children’s advocacy group and the president emeritus of Colorado State 
University.220  The group raised $2.1 million to campaign for the earmarked 
tax, which the coalition did through extensive advertising on television and 
radio and through direct mail.221  This campaign’s most common refrains 
included the presence of a “health care crisis . . . in Colorado,” the fact that 
the earmarked funds would address pervasive “health issues such as cancer 
and heart and lung diseases,” and the comprehensiveness of a program that 
“would address not only tobacco prevention and control but also the 
prevention, early detection, and treatment of cancer and heart and lung 
disease.”222  Observers largely attribute the tax’s passage to the efforts of 
this group.223  Neither the tobacco industry nor any other interest group 
appears to have actively opposed this Quadrant 2 amendment.  
Furthermore, in the years since this earmarked tax increase passed, no 
group has made any substantial effort to challenge or cut away at the tax, 
which has continued to provide a steady source of funds for its designated 
purposes. 
Nor is the Colorado experience unusual in these respects.  Indeed, the 
commonwealth of Virginia has had a similar history of an active public 
health coalition lending support and protection to a cigarette tax increase 
earmarked for a health care trust fund.224  Notably, states that have tried 
funding similar health initiatives out of general revenues have had less 
success.225  This may be because, as I have argued, the states fail to identify 
concentrated constituencies to support the tax.  For example, although 
Nebraska’s legislature approved a $7 million appropriation from general 
revenues for this purpose in 2000, the legislature cut that figure down to 
$405,000 three years later, citing budget concerns.226  
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b.  Missouri’s Sales and Use Tax Earmarked for Conservation 
In 1984, Missouri voters approved a constitutional amendment that 
would earmark a portion of the state’s sales and use tax for soil and water 
conservation and for the acquisition, development, maintenance, and 
operation of state parks and historic sites.227  To get on the ballot in 
Missouri required a petition drive from the measure’s advocates.  An active 
coalition of Missouri and national organizations supported this earmarked 
tax, including the Missouri Conservation Commission, the Citizens 
Committee for Soil, Water and State Parks, the Missouri Department of 
Natural Resources, the Coalition for the Environment, the Missouri Farm 
Bureau, the Conservation Federation of Missouri, the Missouri Parks 
Association, the Sierra Club, the Soil Conservation Society, the Audubon 
Society, and several individual farms.  Their combined campaign in favor 
of the tax highlighted Missouri’s high rate of soil erosion, farmers’ inability 
to pay for necessary soil protection, and state residents’ frequent use of the 
state parks.  The amendment faced only a small degree of resistance, mostly 
from St. Louis–area groups that believed that the amendment unfairly 
helped rural residents while doing nothing for urban areas. 
Since its electoral victory in 1984, voters have steadily renewed the 
tax.228  The initial amendment required state residents to vote to renew the 
tax periodically after its passage.229  As a result, the tax had to appear on 
the ballot again in 1988, 1996, and 2006.230  Each time, a coalition of 
supporters again had to sponsor a petition drive to get the measure on the 
ballot and, each time, this happened without problems.  The earmarked tax 
passed each time with overwhelming margins of support.231  At no time 
since 1984 has anyone seriously attempted to reduce or otherwise 
undermine the tax, and it has been a reliable source of funds for its intended 
purpose throughout its twenty-eight years. 
c.  Utah’s Income Taxes Earmarked for Education 
Utah earmarks its entire personal and corporate income taxes, which have 
been in place since 1931 and 1948 respectively, for K–12 and higher 
education.  This arrangement has given rise to a community of interest 
groups that mobilize in support of the earmarked tax, the vast majority of 
these groups consisting of those that work on public education issues.  The 
groups that have been most vocal about the tax in its recent history have 
included Utah Voices for Children, the Utah School Board Association, the 
Utah School Superintendent Association, the Utah Education Association, 
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the Davis Education Association, and the Utah Association of Public 
Charter Schools. 
In the recent histories of these two earmarked taxes, the taxes have been 
relatively stable, although they do have some “subtractions” and credits.  
Subtractions against state income taxes in Utah are available for, among 
several other items, interest on government bonds232 and income from 
Native American reservations.233  Taxpayers may then take credits against 
tax liability for agricultural fuel,234 stay-at-home parents,235 solar 
projects,236 special needs adoptions,237 and taxes paid to another state,238 
among others.  Although interest groups may have supported the tax laws 
actively, these exceptions suggest that they have not been entirely 
successful in protecting it from encroachment by other interest groups 
seeking preferences. 
On the other hand, the interest groups involved seem to have been 
successful at keeping the income tax a steady source of revenue for public 
schools throughout its history.  Utah’s corporate tax rate has been steady 
since 1984, and several credits are currently available with regard to this 
tax.239  Until 2008, the income tax had a reasonably constant rate structure.  
Over the past twenty years, the income tax had also been reasonably free of 
any new special preferences.240 
Facing a large budget surplus in 2008, Utah cut those rates to a flat 5 
percent.  The advocacy groups campaigned heavily against reducing the tax 
rate.241  In this instance, however, these interest groups lost the battle to 
another coalition of Utah groups that advocated for the rate reduction, 
including the Utah Taxpayers Association and a group of business leaders 
known as the Employers’ Education Coalition.242  The pro-cut groups also 
had the support of many Utah politicians, including then-Governor Jon 
Huntsman.  Despite the efforts of the education groups, Utah’s political 
bodies were able to amass sufficient political will to cut the tax in the face 
of education-group opposition.  Perhaps due to this opposition or 
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subsequent budget conditions, Utah’s income tax has remained stable since 
the rate cut of 2008, without further rate reductions or new carveouts. 
d.  Oklahoma’s Income Tax Earmarked for Teachers’ Pensions 
Since 2003, Oklahoma has earmarked an increasing percentage of its 
individual and corporate income taxes for the Oklahoma Teachers’ 
Retirement System.  It was at that point that beneficiary interest groups 
became involved in income tax politics in Oklahoma, and, in particular, a 
number of education and retirement-related advocacy organizations started 
to work on income tax issues.  They have stayed involved through the 
present time. 
After the Oklahoma legislature partially earmarked the income tax for 
education, the income tax rate fell somewhat, but the income tax base has 
not eroded in any significant way.  In 2004, the legislature cut income tax 
rates.243  The same year, the criteria to obtain a credit for sales tax paid 
became more stringent.244  In addition, Oklahoma residents approved a 
referendum to increase the tax exemption for retirement benefits, to 
eliminate personal and corporate income taxes on capital gains from the 
sale of Oklahoma-based property, and to tighten eligibility criteria further 
for the sales tax credit.245  In 2005, the legislature cut the top marginal 
personal income tax rate and increased the standard deduction and the 
amount of retirement benefits excludible from taxable income.246  The 
legislature also enacted some simplifying reforms.247  The legislature did 
the same thing again in 2006 with regard to the rate, the standard deduction, 
and the exclusion for retirement benefits.248 
In 2007, the legislature slightly lowered the rate again and inserted a state 
program modeled on the federal child-care credit.249  In 2008, the only 
legislative change to the income tax introduced a new voluntary compliance 
initiative250 and in 2009, the only change added an exclusion for income 
from the U.S. Armed Forces.251  The year 2010 brought a reform-oriented 
package that put a two-year moratorium on credits against personal income 
tax liability.252  In 2011, the legislature exempted an aerospace credit from 
the full credit moratorium253 and added a credit for contributions to a 
scholarship-granting organization.254  These small exceptions suggest that 
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the interest groups had a reasonable degree of success in protecting their 
revenue source. 
In 2011, the tax’s beneficiaries faced their first major challenge in 
protecting the tax.  Oklahoma’s conservative new governor, Mary Fallin, 
proposed a plan to phase out the state income tax slowly.  Polls showed that 
most state residents supported this plan, as did majorities in the state senate 
and assembly.  In addition, Governor Fallin’s plan had support from a 
number of out-of-state antitax advocacy groups. 
The plan failed, however, despite this widespread support, and despite 
the fact that Governor Fallin’s party controlled both the Oklahoma House of 
Representatives and Senate.255  Bemoaning this fact, a Wall Street Journal 
editorial in the spring of 2012 wrote, “A cavalcade of lobbyists, including 
local Chambers of Commerce, teachers unions and welfare groups are 
fighting the tax cut.”256  The article complained that “Republicans in the 
Oklahoma Senate are . . . letting the special-interest pressure get to 
them.”257  Governor Fallin similarly attributed the plan’s failure to intense 
special-interest group activity.258  In an editorial, the Daily Oklahoman also 
pointed out the power of interest groups in defeating the cut, explaining, 
“[a]verage Oklahomans weren’t clamoring for a tax cut.  Unlike in Kansas, 
neither was the business lobby.  Tax consumers such as the public 
education establishment would like taxes raised, not lowered.”259  The 
interest group clamor featured voices from a number of groups, including 
the Oklahoma Pension Oversight Commission, Oklahoma’s American 
Association of Retired Persons, the Oklahoma Education Association, a 
liberal advocacy group called the Oklahoma Policy Institution and a Tulsa 
antipoverty group called the Community Action Project.  As observers 
noted, these groups played a critical role in this battle over the income tax.  
Their opposition, the commentary suggests, may have been the major 
obstacle in the way of Oklahoma’s would-be eliminators of the income tax. 
4.  Lessons from Case Studies 
The four brief case studies of earmarked taxes and their development 
demonstrate the political dynamics of earmarking.  Notably, in all four of 
the case studies described here, each tax has beneficiary interest groups that 
are actively involved in advocating for the tax and in protecting its 
revenues.  Colorado’s tax on cigarette companies earmarked for public 
health is a Quadrant 4 tax with concentrated costs and concentrated 
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benefits.  Efforts to prevent or remove special exceptions from this tax 
would fall into Quadrant 4, pitting concentrated loophole-seekers against 
concentrated beneficiaries.  Missouri’s sales and use tax earmarked for 
natural resources is a Quadrant 2 tax with diffuse costs and concentrated 
benefits.  Similarly, stopping any narrowly tailored preferences from 
rooting themselves in this tax would be a Quadrant 4 endeavor.  Utah’s 
income tax earmarked for public education is a Quadrant 2 tax with diffuse 
costs and concentrated benefits.  Again, reforms here would belong in 
Quadrant 4.  Oklahoma’s income tax earmarked for public health is 
similarly a Quadrant 2 tax with diffuse costs and concentrated benefits.  As 
with the first three taxes, trying to keep these laws free of targeted favors 
would give rise to Quadrant 4 politics. 
The concentrated beneficiaries of each of these taxes all play key roles in 
the tax lawmaking process surrounding their taxes.  In Colorado, a coalition 
of public health groups that stand to benefit directly from the cigarette tax 
revenues, including hospitals, community health centers, and children’s 
health groups were the impetus behind getting the referendum on this tax 
onto the ballot.  This group also spent millions of dollars on passing the 
referendum and was extremely successful.  Perhaps aware of the interest 
group momentum behind the tax, the tobacco industry, which would bear its 
concentrated costs, seems to have steered largely clear of the referendum 
debate.  Since the tax passed, the legislature has made no effort to cut it.  
Again, perhaps legislators realize the strength of support this tax has and 
understand that chipping away at the tax would only awaken the ire of these 
interest groups.  At the same time, given the absence of tobacco-industry 
activity surrounding this tax, reducing the tax would not provide a benefit to 
any engaged constituency.  As a result, this earmarked tax remains a steady 
source of revenue for its beneficiaries. 
In Missouri, the sales and use tax earmarked for conservation has a 
similar, actively involved protective constituency.  The tax specifically 
benefits natural resources and farmers, and both environmental groups and 
farm groups have worked hard to develop and maintain this tax.  Referenda 
both created and renewed this tax, and, in both cases, the interest groups 
had to mount a concerted campaign to get the issue on the ballot.  They had 
to work to advocate for it and succeeded both times.  In each case, the tax 
passed by an overwhelming margin.  Given the diffuse costs of a sales and 
use tax, Wilson’s theory might predict that these groups would face no 
opposition and have as easy a fight as they could expect over a referendum 
that would raise all voters’ taxes.  The story of this tax largely bears out that 
expectation.  Only a handful of interest groups spoke out against this tax.  
The groups in question were urban groups representing the St. Louis 
metropolitan area.  They objected not so much to the tax, but to its focus on 
rural areas.  From the tone of their materials, these groups seemed more 
interested in finding ways to funnel taxpayer funds to St. Louis than in 
making sure money stayed away from rural groups.  Perhaps because of this 
focus or because the number of opposed interest groups was reasonably 
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small, the pro-tax environmental and farm groups appeared to have carried 
the day entirely in Missouri, protecting these tax revenues steadily for 
nearly thirty years. 
In Utah, the concentrated beneficiaries of the income tax are education 
groups, many of which have been actively involved in trying to protect and 
grow income tax revenues.  While a number of education groups are vocal 
participants in tax debates, these groups have not had the success of some 
other concentrated beneficiaries of earmarked taxes.  The income tax in 
Utah does have a few credits and deductions—clearly not the thousands 
found in the federal code—and has faced across-the-board cuts in the past 
several years.  The debate over these cuts has made evident how engaged 
education groups are in Utah’s income tax debates.  A number of advocates 
for public education, children, and teachers fought hard against those cuts 
but, in the face of substantial, unified political will to lower the rates, the 
interest groups lost the battle.  At times, their opponents have presumably 
included interest groups hoping to carve special preferences into the tax 
code but, in this most recent fight, the income tax’s supporters went up 
against a coordinated political effort on the part of state Republicans facing 
a large budget surplus.  Their defeat in 2008 notwithstanding, Utah’s 
education-oriented interests remain a key part of that state’s tax debates and 
continue to oppose cuts in the income tax, including those that would create 
loopholes. 
Oklahoma’s income tax, earmarked in part for teachers’ pensions, has 
inspired a broad coalition of supporters, including education advocacy 
groups, teachers’ unions, organizations of retired persons, and nonprofits 
focused on children’s issues.  These groups are also extremely engaged in 
Oklahoma tax lawmaking.  Perhaps because the number of groups is so 
large and includes members as powerful as the American Association of 
Retired Persons and Oklahoma’s largest teachers’ union, the tax’s 
protectors have had a fair amount of success.  Since the income tax was first 
earmarked for teachers’ pensions, the legislature has carved out almost no 
special preferences.  The legislature declared in 2009 a temporary 
moratorium on a huge bundle of the targeted items that had entered the code 
before the earmarking.  In 2011, when the income tax faced a serious threat 
from a Republican governor whose party controlled both houses of the state 
legislature, the protector groups banded together and executed an effective 
campaign that observers credit with preserving the state income tax. 
In all of these cases, the earmarked tax beneficiaries played extremely 
active roles in bolstering their taxes.  This dynamic stands in sharp contrast 
to federal income tax lawmaking, where the diffuse beneficiaries of the 
federal income tax and of federal income tax reform are not substantially 
engaged in tax policymaking.  Unlike in federal income tax politics, in all 
of these states, preventing the tax base from eroding is not a doomed 
Quadrant 3 endeavor but is instead a politically advantaged Quadrant 2 or 4 
project.  The paralysis present at the federal level is largely absent at the 
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state level, pointing to the opportunity that tax earmarking has to help 
overcome federal tax lawmaking paralysis. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the problem of federal tax lawmaking paralysis 
in detail.  Tax lawmaking paralysis has plagued the federal government for 
decades.  Presidents since Kennedy have attempted to reform the tax code 
by ridding it of special preferences for particular interest groups.  
Nevertheless, reform efforts have seemed impossible to pass and to sustain.  
Even the most successful reform effort, the 1986 Act, collapsed almost 
entirely in the years after its passage. 
This Article applied a cost-benefit framework to understand why tax 
reform faces such overwhelming paralysis at the federal level.  In particular, 
this Article argued that loophole-closing tax reform proposals that might 
benefit many citizens struggle, politically speaking, in comparison with tax 
laws that help small, tightly concentrated groups.  Tax laws that impose 
costs on a diffuse citizenry tend to have an easier time passing and 
remaining on the books than laws that impose costs on small, tightly 
concentrated groups. 
This Article then proposed a solution to this paralysis problem that 
lawmakers from both sides of the aisle have been unable to shake. In 
particular, this Article argued that earmarking taxes for particular purposes 
offers an opportunity to overcome tax lawmaking paralysis.  Using 
evidence from the federal government’s primary experience with 
earmarking, from earmarking efforts at the local level, and from four state-
level case studies developed from archival research, this Article 
demonstrated how taxing with purpose gives rise to political dynamics that 
can free federal tax policymakers from their paralysis problem. 
